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$EVWUDFW
I present a concise history of brewing industry concentration from the late 1800s
to the present. The economic history of beer in the United States provides an interesting
study of the impact of regulation, market power, and innovation on industry. Prohibition,
the subsequent growth of the leading macro brewers, and the recent emergence of import
and small craft brewers have shaped the industry into what we know today. Upon their
emergence, craft breweries exhibited a fervent growth in the West and Northeast regions
of America, but have been slow to establish a

presence in the Midwest and South. To

put this into perspective, the two states that sandwich Colorado in population are
Minnesota and South Carolina. As of 2017, Colorado boasts 284 craft breweries with
Minnesota and South Carolina at just 105 and 36 breweries respectively (Brewers
Association). The confluence of events and economic factors that are responsible for the
gap between the South/Midwest and Northeast/West regions have received little attention
in the literature. Regulatory burdens, restrictions on the sale of alcohol in the form of dry
and semi-dry counties, religious ideals, and dominant cultural mores all contribute to this
gap. For my empirical analysis, I sharpen my focus on the role that regulations have
played in the organization of craft breweries across the states. I find that regulatory
influences are significantly related to both production levels and number of craft brewers
in the market, regardless of geographical region. This finding suggests that regional
differences can be partially explained by different state regulations.
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&KDSWHU ,QWURGXFWLRQ
Both the rise of beer industry concentration in the United States and the Craft beer
renaissance can be studied in the context of regional differences. The primary aim of my
study is understanding the role that regulations played in the strong disparate trends in the
brewing market across the regions. A primary target of state regulations in the context of
this industry have been vertical restraints in the distribution of beer. The impact of
vertical restraints has been studied by many, as contract enforcement mechanisms in beer
and other markets (Klein and Murphy, 1988), on sales (Klick and Wright, 2008), and on
entry into the market (Burgdorf, 2015). Often the focus is on mandated exclusive
territories (Rojas, 2012), and exclusive dealing’s impact on competition (Sass, 2005),
(Klick and Wright, 2008) and (Chen, 2014). Industry concentration and mergers have
been comprehensively studied as well (Elzinga and Swisher, 2005) and (Iwasaki,
Tremblay and Tremblay, 2005). The most thorough treatment of this issue is Victor and
Carol Tremblay’s 2005 book on the subject 2005, The US brewing industry: Data and
economic analysis.
Culbertson and Bradford (1991) investigate interstate differences in the price of
macro-producing beer, and Elzinga, Tremblay, and Tremblay (2015) map the spread of
craft beer across the states and use a spatial production model to analyze location choices.
Only one paper has investigated a root cause for regional differences. In “Why so Few
Breweries in the South”, Gohmann (2015) investigates the impact of cultural and

ϯ

governmental institutions on brewers’ entry as an explanation for the relative failure of
the South to produce craft brewers.
Studies that examine the impact these factors have on regional differences are not easy to
find. Early on, differences in regional beer markets were shaping the growth of the
industry. The Northeast market benefitted from cities. Local brewers were able to grow
to meet the large demand for beer in places like New York and Philadelphia, while small
local breweries in the Midwest faced natural limits on growth as a result of the size of the
city they operated in. Due to the development of production technologies that allowed
for the transport of beer, a few of these brewers were able to ship their product to other
markets and thus were able to avoid the local market limits on their production. They
were known as shipping brewers, and the largest of them were eventually called the
National brewers. Today Anheuser-Busch remains, although as of October 2016, they
have merged with a number of international giants, becoming Anheuser-Busch InBev
SA/NV which dominates the global beer market with an estimated 28% market share
(Anheuser-Busch InBev Company Profile, 2016),(Brown, 2016).
The recent growth of craft brewers is just as interesting as the earlier growth of
the national brewers. As of 2014, there are more craft beers per capita in the West and
Northeast than in the South and Midwest. The factors that explain the region-centric
nature of the craft beer market are less obvious. From Geographical Economics, we
understand that firms in new industries tend to cluster and that certainly has happened
here, but what are the other factors that contribute to and potentially drive these

ϰ


differences in regional production? State by state it could be due to differences in
religion, regulation, and size and number of cities.
My thesis examines if regulation has served as a barrier to entry of craft
breweries. The next chapter provides a brief history of industry concentration and the
main factors that caused it. The following chapter provides a review of various
regulations found in the brewing industry. The last two chapters give the empirical
model, results, and main findings.

&KDSWHU(FRQRPLF+LVWRU\RI%HHU,QGXVWU\&RQFHQWUDWLRQ
In the 30 years after the Civil War ended, the beer brewing industry grew
significantly. Over this period the population doubled. That, combined with the influx of
immigrants from beer drinking countries, Germany in particular, contributed to the early
growth of the beer industry.1 In this time period, per capita consumption grew by 340%
(Stack, 2000). German lager became popular in particular, due to the preservation
characteristic in hops. From 1860 to 1920 brewing emerged as a significant industry.
Although market concentration was increasing, before 1920 regional brewers were still
competitive with national brewers. In the 1870s, most brewers were local or regional
because at the time transportation costs were quite high. Another important factor is that
the market for beer was different depending on the size of the city.
Regional brewers in the northeast, specifically in New York and Pennsylvania,
responded to the healthy demand for beer in the concentrated local markets. This allowed


ϭ

ƌĞǁŝŶŐǁĂƐƐŽĐůŽƐĞůǇĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚĞĚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞ'ĞƌŵĂŶƐ͕ƚŚĂƚƚŚĞĨŝƌƐƚĨŝĨƚĞĞŶŽĨhŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐƌĞǁĞƌƐ
ƐƐŽĐŝĂƚŝŽŶ͛ƐƉƌŽĐĞĞĚŝŶŐƐǁĞƌĞƌĞĐŽƌĚĞĚŝŶ'ĞƌŵĂŶƵƉƵŶƚŝůϭϴϳϱ͘;ZŽŽŶĞǇΘƵƚƚ͕ϭϵϳϴͿ

ϱ

them to increase in size and production, a luxury many small local breweries did not have
(Stack, 2000). A few brewers were able to branch out past their regional market due to a
production advantage they had. They had access to the cheap ice in Milwaukee and deep,
cold caves in Missouri and were therefore able to brew and store their product effectively
and in large quantities. Storage capability meant they weren’t confined to regional
markets, and allowed them to produce at a large scale. These were known as shipping
brewers: Pabst, Anheuser-Bush, Miller2, and Schlitz3. To cover their transportation and
advertising costs, they charged more in the areas they shipped to for their ‘superior’
products (Tremblay & Tremblay, p.137).
The first two big shipping breweries4 were Pabst and Anheuser Busch. Pabst
(originally named the Best Brewing Company in Milwaukee) was founded in 1844 by
Jacob Best and owned by his son, Phillip Best in 1860. Captain Pabst, Phillip’s son in
law, became a partner in 1862 and when Phillip retired in 1866 Pabst and Shandein
(Phillip’s other son in law) took over the company. The company was renamed Pabst
after Shandein died, and became the country’s largest brewer by 1880. Captain Pabst
was an astute businessman and the company quickly became a leader in industry

Ϯ
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innovation (Tremblay & Tremblay, p.81; Stack, 2000). As early as 1878 they had a
refrigeration system and used a pipeline to connect the brewery to the bottling house. In
1882 Pabst became the first brewery to produce one million barrels in one year, and in
1935 Pabst was the first brewery to sell beer in steel cans (Stack, 2000; Tremblay &
Tremblay, p.82).
The most successful brewer in history, Anheuser Busch, was founded in 1857 in
St. Louis, Missouri (after purchasing Bavarian Brewery and renaming it). Adolphus
Busch, son in law of the founder, is recognized as being responsible for the early success
of the company. Like Pabst, Anheuser Busch invested in innovative technologies:
refrigerated railcars in 1877, use of the newly invented pasteurization process5, as well as
incorporating merchandising techniques to promote their product (Tremblay &Tremblay,
p.73). These companies pioneered the use of technology and scientific advancement to
brew in large quantities, as well as retain quality while shipping their product. As you
can see from Figure 1 in the Appendix, these two breweries in particular were leading
industry concentration from 1877 to 1895, growing at a faster rate than the entire industry
(Stack, 2000).
From 1895 to just before prohibition, the industry concentration changed. The
national brewers weren’t expanding at the same rate as before and lost market share, but
the industry grew as a whole. There are two reasons for this. The national shipping
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brewers pioneered the use of technological advances early on, but the large regional
brewers were able to catch up by adopting some of these methods as they bought new
plants and equipment. A great example is refrigeration (or artificial cooling), which was
huge for brewing, because it freed brewers from a dependence on natural ice. It is more
reliable and allows for year round brewing, including the summer months. Another
reason for stagnation is the temperance movement and locally owned saloons. Local
breweries generally either owned or controlled saloons. This arrangement was mutually
beneficial because the saloons could rely on the breweries for necessary investments and
the brewers could ensure their product was sold by saloon owners. Even if the saloon
was not owned by the brewery, it was common for saloons to sell one brewery’s beer
through exclusive dealing arrangements. Shipping breweries had invested in saloons to
ensure their product was sold once they shipped it to another city. But the rise of the
temperance movement hit some locations sooner than others, and it became more risky
for shipping brewers to own saloons in many states. By 1910, 17% of the population
lived in dry states and another 31% lived in local option counties/cities that restricted
alcohol, usually through first prohibiting the sale of liquor (Stack, 2000).
A singular event in the United States beer industry was alcohol prohibition (19201933) which prohibited the manufacture, transportation, and sale of alcohol. Prohibition
wiped out the beer industry, and left a series of regulatory obstacles in its wake. Only the
strongest firms survived prohibition. In the year 1880, there were 2,156 total breweries
in the United States. Just before prohibition there were 1,179 breweries, but by 1934 that
number had dropped to 756, and by 1983 only 49 breweries were left (Gohmann, 2015).
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After prohibition, the beer industry resumed production, but it was forever
changed. National brewers had not closed their facilities, instead they had invested in
trucks and bottling methods while selling near beer6, malt syrups7, and soda (Tremblay &
Tremblay, p.73). They were prepared for the repeal. Their rivals, the regional brewers,
weren’t as well positioned and thus, came back at an immediate disadvantage. Most local
and regional breweries had been forced to close and develop other businesses (Stack,
2000). Therefore they did not have the capital or infrastructure to restart their breweries
to the degree the national brewers did. So even though many of the small breweries that
existed before prohibition started producing again they faced numerous obstacles.
Between 1935 and 1940, 10% of breweries failed (Elzinga et al. 2015). The new
regulatory environment accelerated industry concentration. In fact, during prohibition
Anheuser-Busch employees worked with prohibition repeal advocates and disillusioned
temperance movement activists to draft the eventual post-prohibition legal environment
that would govern the brewing industry. This legislation made it impossible for brewers
to own saloons, and thus tied-houses were no longer legal. They advocated for this
because it became ill advised for national shipping brewers to own saloons in every
market they sold to, and by breaking the ties between the manufacturer and the retailer,
they could reduce competition from tied houses (Stack, 2000). Market share of the
national brewers kept growing, eventually leaving the regional brewers far behind.
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The national brewers became the suppliers of beer to the armed forces in WWII, a
large population of potential post war customers. This may have formed a brand loyalty,
and gained them free advertising in the process (Tremblay & Tremblay, p.137). When
televisions became common in households around the 1950s, there was a huge
opportunity in advertising. The beer industry as a whole spent more ($/barrel) on TV
commercials from 1950-1960 than any other decade before 2000 (Tremblay & Tremblay,
p.53).
Tremblay and Tremblay argue that in 1950, there were there were 350 firms in an
industry that could efficiently support 829 firms. But by 1960, 175 firms were competing
in a market that couldn’t support more than 88. This marks the beginning of what they
call the war of attrition among brewers. Brewers had few strategic options. They could
expand internally and come out with new products, merge with a competitor that
produced a similar product, find a profitable market niche, or exit. A failing brewer
would drastically cut investment in all departments except direct labor and materials in
order to squeeze the last bit of profit out before exiting. The mass exit of firms was a
direct consequence of the increase of the MES relative to the size of the market
(Tremblay & Tremblay, p.47). Many failing breweries were dropping their prices before
they exited the market, creating tough price competition for new brewers. This war of
attrition benefited the national companies such as Anheuser-Busch. “Anheuser-Busch is
the largest and most profitable brewer in the U.S. and the only macro brewer to
experience continued growth in market share from 1970-2003” (Iwasaki, Tremblay &
Tremblay 2005). See Figures 2 and 3.
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The antitrust division of the Department of Justice greeted the structure of the
beer industry post WWII with great suspicion. (Elzinga & Swisher, 2005). In an attempt
to protect small competitors and impede the rising industry concentration, the courts took
a strong anti-merger position. Two Supreme Court cases brought by the U.S. government
over the issue are noteworthy; U.S. v. Pabst Brewing Co. and U.S. v. Falstaff. Both the
Pabst/Blatz and Falstaff/Narragansett mergers were ultimately blocked by the anti-trust
decisions of the Supreme Court. On the ruling against Pabst, Elzinga and Swisher state
that:
“The Court concluded its analysis by noting that the government was under no duty
to prove that the trend toward concentration in the beer industry was the result of
mergers, as opposed to, for example, less efficient firms being unable to compete
and exiting the market.”
In the case of U.S. v. Falstaff, they had an especially difficult time pinning down the
relevant geographic market. Today it is likely that neither of these mergers would have
been challenged as they would not increase the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) past
1000 in their markets. (Elzinga and Swisher, 2005). Another issue with anti-trust
enforcement was that the courts failed to account for the case of the failing firm. Cases
where a firm on the brink of failure is allowed to merge with another firm provided that
the merger itself is the least anti-competitive option available. Considering the number
of failing firms in this industry at that time, the lack of consideration in this department is
significant. Ironically, Anheuser Busch likely benefitted from anti-trust law during the
1950 through the 1960s. The U.S. anti-trust division was particularly concerned with high
industry concentration during this time period, and they successfully blocked numerous
potential mergers. Some of these potential mergers were from big breweries that would
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have otherwise stood a chance at competing with Anheuser Busch. In doing this, the
courts may have ensured the continued concentration of the market at higher levels than
otherwise. The denial of these mergers was based on the knowledge at the time which
underestimated MES and misunderstood the role that mergers had played in this industry
(Iwasaki, Tremblay & Tremblay, 2005). The 1960s marked a time of strict enforcement
of antitrust law that lacked a sophisticated economic analysis on market concentration
and competitive effects. This was eased up during de-regulation of the late 1970s and
early 1980s. The Merger Guidelines published in 1983 did a lot to bring an economic
analysis to anti-trust, focusing on consumer welfare and giving a clear definition of
relevant product and geographic markets. It provided that low market shares and industry
concentration is not a significant basis for challenging a merger (Elzinga and Swisher,
2005). The industry shakeout of this time may have been less severe than it was had
more mergers been allowed.
During the war of attrition in the 1970s among the premium and regional brewers,
imported beers entered the market. What drove this new development? The argument
Tremblay and Tremblay present in The US Brewing Industry is that a shift in demand for
lighter beers initially drove macro dark beer producers out of business. During this time,
Miller’s light beer became very popular and Anheuser-Bush re-formulated their popular
super-premium Michelob to have a lighter taste. Tremblay & Tremblay argue that a void
in the market was created for heartier beers, and that imports swooped in to fill part of the
void. The imports already produced good quality darker beers in their homelands, and
enough of it to reach scale efficiency. However, transportation costs did make them more
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expensive. After the 1970s, the market shares of imports increased, and domestic
specialty or micro-breweries began to appear after 1980. There were 8 craft brewers in
1980, 269 in 1990, and 1,469 by 2000 and 1,756 in 2010 and 2,374 in 2012 (Elzinga et al.
2015). See Figure 4. As of 2015 there were 5,234 craft breweries (Brewers Association).
The market share of imports grew from 0.04% post-prohibition, then 0.11% in 1950, and
now the United States imports more beer than any other country in the world. Craft beer
began to increase in market share from 1990s-2000s. In recent years the rise of imports
and the craft beer revolutions are slowly reversing the industry concentration of the early
post-war period (Tremblay & Tremblay, p.133).
Concentration of the industry was due in large part to cost advantages of the large
brewers. Anheuser-Bush had a competitive advantage in the 1950s. They had state-ofthe-art plants in strategic locations and successfully marketed some of the most popular
beers. National Ads attracted consumers, national brewers built new and more efficient
plants, some small brewers survived in niche markets, but most lost market share and
responded by cutting their price. Tough price competition deterred entry and few small
firms survived. American beer was a good example of a natural oligopoly. With new
technologies, economies of scope induce firms to expand product lines and increase
mergers of similar products. It is important to note that mergers are not a cause of
industry concentration, but a byproduct. Mergers were usually horizontal and indicative
of a failing business, but not always (Tremblay & Tremblay, p.45). In fact today you see
many craft breweries being bought out by big beer.
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Technological Change and Investment in Brewing
In the late 1800s, breweries were enjoying the benefits of new advancements in
technology. Refrigeration, pasteurization, and the ability to bottle their product were the
most notable advancements (Stack, 2000). As soon as prohibition was enacted breweries
were immediately faced with a decision. They had to consider what to do with their
plants and equipment, and act based on their expectations as to how permanent
prohibition would actually be. Many regional brewers decided to divest all brewing
equipment, taking an immediate loss. An alternative option was to produce something
else with their equipment. The leading pre-prohibition shipping brewers (Busch, Pabst,
Schlitz, and Blatz) sold their saloons and began to produce a malt beverage containing
less than half a percent of alcohol (near beer) (Krebs and Orthwein 165). This allowed
them to keep their brewing staff active, which would later turn out to be an advantage.
Brewers could also produce malt syrup, which everyone knew was for homebrewing and
not for cookies as they advertised. The national brewers also increased their inventory of
trucks and bottling equipment for their soft drinks, ‘near beer’ and ginger ale. In the
1920s, the American Can Company provided cans for Busch. They would later pioneer
beer cans in 1935 (Conny, 1990).
The end of prohibition, in 1933, came with many new laws attached. Breweries
could no longer own bars or saloons, and were now required to distribute their product
through a wholesaler. Many small breweries could not reopen and be profitable, and
many that tried didn’t last. From 1935-1940 the total number of breweries fell by 10%.
This meant that the shipping brewers were facing less competition from their former
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rivals while having a leg up on investment in new technologies (United States Brewers
Almanac, 1956).
As refrigeration technology advanced after WWII, brewers were able to retain
quality while shipping their beer longer distances. In addition, people could now store
beer in cans at their homes. By 1940, 72% of Americans had refrigerators in their homes
(Stack, 2000). Following the depression, American consumers’ preferences shifted
towards that of dependable and storable goods. Preserved, brand name items were
growing in popularity due to the convenience and security they afforded. A cold,
prepackaged, consistent product is exactly what the National brewers were able to
provide (Stack, 2000). National brewers restarted their expansion after prohibition. The
advent of canning machines and refrigeration contributed to the expansion of national
brewers over regional ones. Beer is generally sold either packaged or as draught beer. In
1935, 30% of total sales went to packaged (bottles and cans), with the remaining 70% to
draught beer. By 1940, they were about equal at 52% and 48%, respectively. By 1955,
78% of beer sold was packaged and only 22% was draught (1979 United States Brewing
Association, 20). This decline in draught beer is indicative of the decline in regional
brewers and the growth of the national brewers and their packaged product.
Transportation costs decreased, but the national brewers maintained the premium price on
the beer they sold.
The growth of national brewers was made possible by the emergence of scale
economies and technological innovation which increased the minimum efficient scale for
brewers. Technological advancement increased the efficient scale in brewing in a few
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ways. For one, beer could be packaged at a much faster rate than before, six times faster
to be exact, making large scale production more efficient (Tremblay & Tremblay, p.32).
In the 1950s, 330,000 barrels of beer were required to operate an efficient canning line
compared with 2 million in the late 1980s. That means that beer was packaged at a rate
of 2,000 12oz cans per minute (Tremblay & Tremblay, p.32). Much of the brewing
process became automated, reducing the labor costs of the firm as capital became more
productive. A great example of this is the Schlitz plant built in 1970 in Memphis, TN.
When compared with the company’s older 1954 Los Angeles plant, the 1970 plant had
45% less labor costs, and 4% less per unit cost (Keithahan, 1978). The emergence of
scale economies helps explain the industry concentration, most notably from 1950-1980.
In 1950, minimum scale efficiency required only 100 thousand barrels a year to reach,
but by 1980 it jumped to 16 million barrels a year. (Tremblay & Tremblay, p.46).
The money saved using multi-plant operation is also responsible for the increase
in the efficient scale of the brewery and in part, for the growth of the first tier (superpremium) breweries. One important input in the brewing process is water, obviously. So
when water treatment plants and their scale advanced, it allowed breweries to produce in
large volumes in any part of the country without worrying about fluctuations in water
quality affecting their standard of taste (Tremblay & Tremblay, 2005). As William Coors
famously said, “you could make Coors from swamp8 water and it would taste exactly the
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same” (Brymer et al., Business Insider, 2016). Sherer et al (1975) found that firms with 3
or 4 plants gained cost advantages due to savings in marketing, investment flexibility,
and risk management. In the 1990s, industry experts stated that the efficient number of
plants was 5 or 6 and as of 2004, only Anheuser Busch and Miller had as many.
Anheuser Busch (now a subsidiary of InBev), currently owns 12 breweries in the US (AB
InBev, 2012).
Technological change certainly drove the industry concentration, but it can’t
explain it entirely. If you look at this question in the context of scale efficiency you will
notice that in 2000, Miller was more than twice the size required for minimum scale
efficiency while Anheuser-Bush was operating at 5 times MES. An Anheuser-Bush
executive stated that TV ads in the 1950s were partially responsible for their success
relative to the rest of the industry (Tremblay & Tremblay, 2005). If this view is correct,
TV advertising helped kill the regional brewer, at least for a little period of time.
National beers took advantage of the new marketing tool during the period that one could
argue was at its most influential in terms of advertising. The big players in the industry
were already on the track to having a very large market share, but they also took
advantage of an opportunity that others couldn’t. Television was one of the reasons that
the national brewers grew, and the regional brewers began to decline. Advertising is
much like a capital investment, effectively increasing the scale in an industry which
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already has large fixed cost (Tremblay & Tremblay) (Iwasaki, Tremblay and Tremblay,
2005).

Emergence of Craft Brewers:
Beginning in the late 1970s, there was an increased emphasis in producing light
beer by the big breweries, while simultaneously there was an increase in imported beer
sales. Light macro beer had a 4% market share in 1984, 22% in 1985, and 43% in 2000.
The concentration of the market on light beer was a decision by the big brewers. They
bet on what people liked, but in doing so, they left a portion of the market unfulfilled. As
mentioned earlier, the war of attrition in the 1970s combined with an increase in
disposable income, left an opening for more variety in the beer market9. This niche was
filled initially by the import brands, but later by the microbreweries. Craft beer and
imports provided darker and more diverse beer than the macro sector. The rise of
microbreweries and local brewpub establishments mark a return to the quality and
enjoyment of beer pre-prohibition. According to Choi & Stack, pre-prohibition beer was
as varied and as good as craft beer today. Most craft brewers adhere to Germany’s
Reinheitsgebot10, or purity law, which limits ingredients to barley, malt, water, and hops.
This means they don’t use corn, rice adjuncts, or sugar in brewing. Many also use malted
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wheat, malted rye, fruit, herbs, and spices for distinct flavors. As a result, the flavor is
judged to be by many as darker, heartier, and more flavorful in contrast with the paler,
lighter flavors of mass produced beer. (Tremblay & Tremblay, p.116). These high
quality products reflect European brewing styles. The first craft brewer of today, Fritz
Maytag even brought back old recipes not seen since pre-prohibition.
Elzinga, et al. consider Fritz Maytag to be the man to thank for the craft beer
renaissance. In a sense he founded it, by being the first to try to create the quality of
traditional beer and imports. He bought the failing Anchor Steam Brewing Company in
1965. Aside from brewing traditional porters, holiday beers, and the first wheat beer
since prohibition, he brewed the first IPA (Elzinga, et al.,2015). According to Bart
Watson, chief economist for the Brewers Association, the IPA is the most popular style
of craft beer to date. Its’ popularity exploded from 2008 to 2015, accounting for 27% of
craft beer sales in 2015 (Brewers Association). Maytag and other early brewers were
responsible for the seeding of craft beer, but the demand took roots from three authors.
Charles Papazion, Fred Eckhardt and Michael Jackson all wrote books and magazines on
homebrewing that reached a wide audience. Their contributions inspired homebrewing
and sparked an interest among people.
Initially, the home-brewing/microbrewery movement took off in California in the
1980’s and moved along the West Coast. From San Francisco to Seattle, breweries were
opening up shop. Two very successful craft breweries began in this time and place.
Sierra Nevada, founded in 1980 in Chico, CA, and Redhook founded in Seattle in 1981
became so successful that they grew to regional brewery status. The number of firms
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slowly grew from 1977-1986 (Tremblay & Tremblay, p.116). Aiding this growth were
two legal changes in the late 1970s. In 1977, the government cut federal excise taxes
from $9 to $7 a barrel for firms that produce less than two million barrels in a year11. In
1978, the Cranston act made home-brewing legal. This allowed brewers to experiment
freely. Although the craft brewery movement did not catch its wind until around 1985,
for the following decade they experienced a period of rapid growth at a rate of more than
16% per year.
The 1990s were a time of economic prosperity. It is known that in that time, the
demand for locally produced goods increased and microbreweries emphasized the local
aspect of their product, capitalizing on that trend. A few microbreweries grew into
successful regional brewers. Sierra Nevada, Boston Beer Company, New Belgium,
Anchor Brewing, Harpoon, and others all broke past the microbrewery level of
production. These regional specialty brewers accounted for nearly 60% of the craft beer
market as of 2001. Sierra Nevada and Boston Brewing Company, the two largest, had a
combined share of 27% (Tremblay & Tremblay, p.120).
The Macro brewers took notice of the rise in craft brewers, and they responded in
several ways. Busch and Miller both used financial incentive programs to form exclusive
dealing contracts with wholesalers. Distributors had to exclusively carry their products,
including their own personal brands of specialty beer. They also bought partial interests
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in several craft breweries giving these preferred access to distribution networks. In the
mid-1990s, Anheuser Busch bought partial interests in Redhook and Widmer Brothers,
while Miller bought partial interest in Celis and Shipyard. Today, successful craft
breweries are being bought out by Anheuser Busch InBev. They acquired Goose Island in
2011, and since then have acquired Blue Point Brewing, Elysian Brewing, Golden Road
and Breckenridge Brewery (Snyder, 2016; Kell, 2016). This practice is not confined to
the US, either. Busch is buying up craft beer brands in the U.K., Mexico, Colombia,
Brazil, and Canada (Snyder, 2016). This affords the craft brewers bought out, far
reaching distribution networks and huge plants to brew their beer on a much larger scale.
As well as investing in craft beer, large brewers tried to grab more of the market
by making their own craft beer under a different name. These cases were called
“phantom” brewers, and they benefited from the large distribution networks that their
silent owners had amassed over the years. There were several phantom beers created in
the 1990s, but the most notable and only successful one, Blue Moon, has done very well
indeed. Blue Moon was created by Coors, but advertised as a craft beer. It is likely that
many of their customer base didn’t even know this, because they specifically designed
the beer cans and bottles without the mention of Coors on them at all.
The initial growth phase of the microbrewers came to an end in the late 1990s, a
period of industry shakeout. The number of breweries decreased by 10% from 19982000. Distribution bottlenecks were a direct result of the tremendous growth in the
earlier period. Brands struggled to gain customer loyalty because many of the craft beers
at this time were similar. They were similar in product characteristics, often named after

Ϯϭ


animals and with fruity undertones. Many new brewers had not worked out the kinks in
product quality and consistency. (Tremblay & Tremblay, p.130). New brewers depend
on word of mouth to get their products off the ground but restaurants and bars could only
have so many new craft beers on tap (Tremblay & Tremblay, p.130; Brewers
Association). Tremblay and Tremblay state in their 2005 book that the growth of the
market in the 90s enticed entrepreneurs until it couldn’t support them all. People saw the
success of the microbreweries and flooded the market. This wave of entry was lagged
due to the time consuming and expensive nature of building plants and buying equipment
and perfecting the product. There was too much entry, which created a mass exit
(Tremblay & Tremblay, p.132). One struggle that craft beer finds in the market is the
much higher cost of production. Imports and macro brewers have an established popular
product that is already produced in multiple plants. Craft brewers use more expensive
inputs and brew in small batches. This means that they cannot reach similar scale
efficiencies, because the less beer you produce, the higher the cost per unit.
Craft beer has since recovered from this shakeout. From 1995 to 2012, craft
beer’s share of the overall market went from 2% to 6.4% (imports were at 13.3%).
Economic prosperity and increases in personal income affect consumer demand for both
variety and locally produced goods (Elzinga, 2015). From 2012 to today, craft beer has
nearly doubled their market share to 11% (Kell, 2016).
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&KDSWHU5HJXODWLRQDQGWKH9HUWLFDO2UJDQL]DWLRQRIWKH%HHU
,QGXVWU\
This chapter discusses the vertical relations between producers and retailers in the
beer industry. These relationships have been subject to significant and varied focus of
regulators over time and across states. Economists have developed theoretical models of
vertical restraints which apply to the context of the beer market. These models highlight
pro-competitive and anti-competitive aspects of vertical restraints. The ebb and flow of
regulations in this area over time reflects different emphasis on these aspects.
In the days before prohibition, restrictions on alcohol were nothing like they were
after. At the time, a prevalent feature of distribution was the vertically integrated nature
of saloons and breweries. Retailers were often ‘tied to’ the upstream distillery or
brewery. Leases, mortgages, and other financial incentives accompanied exclusive
contracts that forbid retailers from selling a rival’s product. These bars and pubs
operated under exclusive contracts with a specific brewer and often outright owned by
the brewer (Stack, 2000).
Apparently this form of business was “too successful.” The impetus for political
action behind prohibition was, in part, the prior success of sales tactics of alcohol
marketing and producers. The amount of consumption this led to was regarded by the
prohibitionists as harmful to society as a whole. It comes as no surprise that when
prohibition ended the same people would try to keep this form of distribution from
happening again.
When prohibition was repealed in 1933, the market could not return to its prior
form of organization. Although alcohol was once again legal, there were strings attached.
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The states were soon able to and continued to heavily regulate the alcohol industry
(Smith & Yandle 79). Tied houses were no longer allowed, so states adopted one of two
options. They chose to operate either as license or control states. In control states, the
state acts as the distributor. License states allow private retailers to operate, although
they were required to follow the three-tiered system where brewing, distribution, and
retailing were separated. Most states are now license states (Smith, 2002), and some
states are now opting to allow self-distribution.

Three-Tiered Distribution:
The regulatory environment post prohibition was designed specifically to break
up vertical integration in the brewing industry. The most straightforward way they did
this was by separating the brewing and distributing of beer. The subsequent distribution
system is composed of three tiers. The first tier is the brewer, the middle tier is the
wholesaler or distributor, and the final tier is the retail outlet or bar (Clements & Kurtz,
2014). Thirty-two states currently follow a three tiered system of production,
distribution, and retail. It was originally designed to limit the ‘immoral marketing
tactics’ of pre-prohibition, discourage the proliferation of breweries, and urge people to
drink moderately (Clements & Kurtz, 2014). As of today, the consumption of alcohol is
widely accepted; the intentions of keeping the system have shifted. It is still in place
today due to the large tax revenues it collects (it collected as much as $255 million in
Georgia 2000), as well as the “Bootleggers and Baptists” relative interests are aligned
with its survival (Yandle & Smith, 82; Smith, 2002). Its’ role in today’s world is a
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debated issue. In this system the top tier is the brewer, the middle tier is the distributor or
wholesaler, and the bottom tier is the retailer.
Over time, states made two-tiered distribution legal, but this change in regulation
did not occur evenly throughout the country. As of 2013, self-distribution is allowed in
only 6% of the South, and 33% of the Midwest allow breweries this option. Many
brewers would prefer self-distribution. It allows them to have more control over how
their beer is marketed and how well it is stored and transported, among other things.
Barrel cap laws play a small role in this. If a brewery produces over a certain amount of
barrels in a year, they must apply for a different type of permit, the cap and the fee
associated with the permit changes vary depending on the state. It appears that most
barrel cap laws are not a barrier to growth. Once the brewery has outgrown their permit,
they get a new one, often at a higher yet relatively insignificant cost. However in 6
states, the barrel cap law pertains specifically to the point at which self-distribution
allowed. Exceed 25,000bbls in North Carolina and you must go through a wholesaler.
Tennessee has the same barrel cap as NC and after exceeding it, the right to selfdistribute is revoked. Texas has a cap at 40,000BBLs a year, West Virginia’s cap is
10,000BBLs and Wisconsin’s cap is at 300,000. In Oregon, this applies to brewpubs with
a 5,000BBL cap. North Carolina is currently proposing a bill to increase self-distribution
allowance from 25,000BBLs to 100,000BBLs. The current barrel cap law means that a
brewery can self-distribute only if they sell less than 25,000BBLs a year. Once they
exceed 25,000, they have to go through a wholesaler. This means that brewers would
lose some degree of control over that segment of their business. It is in a sense a cap on
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growth as well as barrels. If the bill gets passed, then brewers would be free to grow
without losing this control. Sometimes going through an independent wholesaler would
be more beneficial as well, but the option needs to be there. Another legal regulatory
obstacle is the licensing of alcohol distribution which is divided into license states (32)
and control states (18). Although the basic tiered structure is the same, license states
operate by forcing businesses to acquire licensing for each of the three tiers. Control
states take on the role of distributor or retailer so that they may exert tight control over
the promotions and sale of alcohol.

Exclusive Territories:
There is an obvious principal agent problem at play here. To mitigate this issue,
upstream firms can issue exclusive dealing contracts, resale price maintenance, or
exclusive territories on wholesalers (Rojas, 2012). Because the contract between a
brewer and distributor is not a sufficient mechanism for promotional effort, exclusive
territories and exclusive dealing clauses can alleviate the situation. Culbertson and
Bradford (1991), as well as Sass and Saurman (1993) find states with mandatory
exclusive territories produce more beer at a higher price. Rojas (2012) finds an increase
in sales and minimal price impact of the law change to mandatory exclusive territories.
Brewers are free to adopt exclusive territories in states that do not mandate them12 (Klick
and Wright, 2008). If empirical analysis shows that mandated exclusive territories are
beneficial to both the number of brewers and total production, then why aren’t more
brewers adopting this into their contracts with their distributor? This suggests that laws
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mandating exclusive territories could be capturing some transaction costs between a
manufacturer and distributor. Contracts with wholesalers heavily favor them over
brewers. Because the power is in their (wholesaler) hands, the brewer might not be able
to have exclusive territories written into the contract. Rojas (2012) argues that federal
anti-trust law could crack down on exclusive territories as a vertical restraint policy, but
not in states that mandate exclusive territories. This regulation serves as a protection
against the government.
The implication here is that exclusive territories are likely desired in states that do
not mandate the practice, but the fear of punishment keeps both parties from adopting the
policy.
The combination of exclusive dealing and exclusive territories is similar to the preprohibition tied houses, although not nearly as common. Exclusive dealing when
combined with exclusive territories can be a useful way for brewers to avoid dealer freeriding, reducing incentive conflicts between manufacturers and their distributors, yet
there has not been much empirical evidence to back this up (Klein and Murphy, 1988;
Klick and Wright).
Klein and Murphy investigate vertical restraints theories in various industries with
an emphasis on the FTC Coors case. Coors was accused of having unfair termination
provisions by the FTC. They could terminate a contract with their wholesaler with notice
of 5 days or within 30 days without a notice. Coors’s product was unique in that it was
not pasteurized. This meant a significant drop in product quality could occur if the beer
was not refrigerated. Because of this Coors had a vested interest monitoring their
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distribution process. They used both exclusive territories and resale price maintenance to
ensure their product maintained quality throughout the distribution process and that retail
stores would rotate and refrigerate their product appropriately. Resale price maintenance
staved off retail free riders (consumers are more likely to blame the manufacturer for
poor quality than a retailer) (Klein and Murphy, 1988).

Exclusive Dealing:
There are two schools of thought on exclusive dealing, with limited empirical
evidence to resolve the issue. By aligning the interests of the wholesaler with the brewer
and preventing free riding of the wholesaler on promotions of the product, exclusive
dealing contracts may lead to greater output at reduced prices (Klick & Wright, 2008).
The costs of the effort the distributor put in to make sure the retailer is always stocked
with your beer, have nice looking displays, or tailoring marketing to local consumers; are
borne entirely by the distributor. The benefits of this go entirely to the beer producer.
This leads to an inefficient, low level of investment in promotion by the distributor, (what
the neo-prohibitionists may have in mind). And on top of that, the wholesaler/distributor
might be selling several brands of beer, and this type of investment in one brand could
reduce sales of the others (Klick & Wright, 2008) (Klein and Murphy, 1988).
Therefore, exclusive dealing in this context can be pro-competitive. But other
issues come along with these exclusive dealing contracts. Exclusive dealing is alleged to
have anti-competitive aspects. It could deprive rivals of the opportunity to compete for
customers. This would make prices higher and selection smaller for the consumer (Klick
& Wright, 2008). In 1997, after Anheuser Busch launched exclusive dealing contracts
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with their distributors, microbreweries complained that their products were being
dropped (Chen, 2014). Chen (2014) estimates the foreclosure effects of exclusive dealing
on microbreweries and finds that exclusive dealing contracts between distributors and
Anheuser Busch raise the fixed cost for specialty brewers in the affected area. AnheuserBusch, Miller, and Coors all used exclusive dealing contracts with their distributors
(Sass, 2005). Sass finds the use of exclusive dealing contracts increases total sales (his
sample of breweries are the industry giants). He finds that exclusive dealing by
Anheuser-Busch distributors increases their sales, but does not have a significant effect
on the prices of rivals.
In order to identify the competitive effects of various vertical restraint policies,
Klick and Wright compare states where certain policies are prohibited with states where
these policies are either allowed or mandated. An argument for exclusive dealing
contracts and exclusive territories can be made in the case of franchise laws. A
contractual agreement between a manufacturer and distributor alone will not be sufficient
to assure an optimal level of performance on the distribution side. These contracts are
incomplete, it would be too costly, or impossible to detail every level of expected
performance on the side of the distributor. One key feature of these contracts is the threat
of termination due to underperformance (Klick and Wright, 2008). This key feature is
weak in the context of beer franchise laws.

Franchise Laws:
Perhaps the most egregious burden on breweries are the termination clauses in
beer franchise contracts. Typical contracts are built to protect the distributor at the

Ϯϵ


expense of the brewer. It is prevalent enough that it has become a joke common among
craft brewers.
“Do you know what the difference is between your marriage and the contract with
your distributor?”
“If you’re unhappy, at least you can get out of your marriage.” (Aubuchon, 2016)
When these laws were created, the distributor was a small operation compared with big
beer. Now, things have changed. Big Beer still has the lions’ share of the market, but the
total number of breweries is increasing thanks to craft beer. These laws put small
brewers in a tough situation. The brewer has to have to have ‘good cause’ to terminate a
contract with a distributor, and the definition of good cause is usually made at the state
level. This makes it very hard for breweries to have flexibility in distribution of their
product. (Clements & Kurtz, 2014; Klick & Wright, 2008). Proving that you have
‘good’ or ‘just cause’ to terminate a contract is a difficult and tedious bureaucratic
process (Klick & Wright, 2008). If good cause is found, then the brewer typically has to
file a written notice between 60 and 90 days to the wholesaler they are trying to
terminate. Then, the wholesaler must be given an opportunity to solve the issue they are
accused of, and if they do (or even if they simply give a plan to fix the problem) the
termination is rendered ineffective. This is called a ‘notice and cure’ requirement. These
can be waved under special circumstances, if the wholesaler is found guilty to a serious
crime, defaults on payments or loses their license, etc. (Brewers Association, 2015).
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Wholesalers on the other hand, can sell the rights to distribute at any point without the
consent of the manufacturer (Klick & Wright, 2008)13.
The way the laws are usually written leaves brewers at the whim of the
distributors. It is a system that could be taken advantage of in every situation it is
present. Beer franchise laws make termination of these contracts very difficult for the
brewer. Without “just cause” the brewer is helpless, and even with just cause, a
wholesaler can often correct their mistake or simply draft a plan to correct their mistake.
On top of all of this, the wholesalers typically have the right to sell their right to distribute
a supplier’s beer without the consent of the brewer. One provision that is typical of these
laws is exclusive territories. Evidence suggests that this addition will offset some of the
less fair franchise laws.
Three restrictive policies Klick and Wright examine are prohibitions on exclusive
dealing contracts between brewers and wholesalers, mandated exclusive territories, and
harsh termination restrictions over the period 1980-2000. They find that the mandated
exclusive territory effect is positive and significant, but not statistically different between
states with 3 tiered and two tiered distribution. They also find that termination
restrictions have a negative and significant impact on beer sales. They also find that
states that prohibit exclusive dealing contracts have a positive and significant effect on


ϭϯ

<ůŝĐŬĂŶĚtƌŝŐŚƚƉƌŽƉŽƐĞĂƚŚĞŽƌǇƚŚĂƚďƌŽĂĚĞƌƚĞƌŵŝŶĂƚŝŽŶƌŝŐŚƚƐĐĂŶůĞĂĚƚŽƉƌŽďůĞŵƐǁŚĞƌĞĂ
ǁŚŽůĞƐĂůĞƌŝƐƵŶũƵƐƚůǇƚĞƌŵŝŶĂƚĞĚĨŽƌĨŝŶĚŝŶŐĂŶƵŶĞǆƉĞĐƚĞĚůǇƉƌŽĨŝƚĂďůĞŵĂƌŬĞƚĂŶĚƚŚĞŵĂŶƵĨĂĐƚƵƌĞƌ
;ďƌĞǁĞƌͿƚĞƌŵŝŶĂƚĞƐƚŚĞŝƌĐŽŶƚƌĂĐƚƚŽŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚĞĂŶĞǁŽŶĞĨŽƌďĞƚƚĞƌƚĞƌŵƐŽƌƚŽƐĞůůƚŽĂŶŽƚŚĞƌ
ǁŚŽůĞƐĂůĞƌ͕ƚŚĞƌĞďǇŐĂŝŶŝŶŐƌĞƚƵƌŶƐĨƌŽŵƚŚĞŝŶǀĞƐƚŵĞŶƚĂŶĚŶŽƚŚĂǀŝŶŐƚŽƐƉůŝƚƚŚĞƌĞǀĞŶƵĞĂƚƚŚĞƌĂƚĞ
ƚŚĂƚǁĂƐĂŐƌĞĞĚƵƉŽŶ͘dŚŝƐĐĂƐĞŝƐŶŽƚĐŽŶǀŝŶĐŝŶŐŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ͕ďĞĐĂƵƐĞƚŚŝƐƐĐĞŶĂƌŝŽǁŽƵůĚŶŽƚďĞĐŽŵŵŽŶ͕
ŝƚǁŽƵůĚďĞĂŶŽƵƚůŝĞƌ͘dŚĞĂůƚĞƌŶĂƚŝǀĞ͕ƚŚĞƌĞƐƚƌŝĐƚŝǀĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĂƚŝŽŶƐǇƐƚĞŵ͕ŝƐǀĞƌǇĐŽŵŵŽŶ͘

ϯϭ


beer sales. Sass only tested the impact of exclusive dealing with in the big breweries. It
is likely that big breweries are more able to negotiate exclusive dealing clauses into their
contracts than the small brewers, and so where exclusive dealing occurs, the small
brewers would be negatively impacted. Klick and Wright argue that the negative
coefficient on exclusive dealing is because small breweries just starting out are underrepresented because there are less wholesalers than there would have been. They do not
directly test this theory.

&KDSWHU(PSLULFDO$QDO\VLV,PSDFWRI5HJXODWLRQ
Empirical Strategy:
The emergence of craft beer marked a new form of competition in the industry.
The effects of regulation and their implication for regional market differences on craft
brewers in particular, deserve special attention.
This section provides an empirical model which examines the factors leading to or
inhibiting the growth of small brewers in the market. The data I use is pooled annually
from 1984-2013 across all 50 states and the District of Columbia. I chose the quantity (in
10,000 bbls) produced by brewers under a ‘certain threshold’14 for my dependent
variable. This method examines production by state as a function of several regulatory
and economic factors to see if regulations influence production and entry into the market.
Burgdorf (2015) studied the number of entrants focusing on the difference between the
absence of production (a non-entity) and positive output when a new brewer enters the
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market. In my analysis I incorporate growth on the extended margin where small
brewers can increase production given that market conditions and regulatory constraints
allow. I follow the methodology of Elzinga, Tremblay, and Tremblay (2015) by using
the Tobit model to estimate production levels by states as a function of regulatory and
economic influences. Additionally, I incorporate regional dummies in my analysis and
use three specific state level regulations and interactions of these regulations. I run two
nearly identical Tobit models, but for the purpose of comparison I add regional dummies
to the second model. If the economic and regulation coefficients are not affected, I know
the regional dummies are not highly collinear with regulations. I also use a number of
interaction terms to investigate whether combinations of different regulation have a
stronger effect than the single regulations alone.

Estimation Model:
Following the lead of Elzinga, Tremblay, and Tremblay I use a Tobit15 model to
estimate the following equations:
Equation 1:
Prodit = B0 + B1 pop + B2 unemp + B3 pctblack + B4 rgdpcap + B5realtax + B6winecap +
B7 spiritcap + B8 dryratio + B9 exterr+ B10 fran + B11 threetier + B12 exfran + B13
threex +
B14 threefran + B15 threeexfran + const
Equation 2:
Prodit = B0 + B1 pop + B2 unemp + B3 pctblack + B4 rgdpcap + B5realtax + B6winecap +
B7 spiritcap + B8 dryratio + B9 exterr+ B10 fran + B11 threetier + B12 exfran + B13
threex +
B14 threefran + B15 threeexfran + B16 South +B17 Midwest + B18 West + const16
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Prod it is the total output in 10,000 31-gallon barrels in state i and year t.
Descriptions for each variable and expected signs are shown in the Appendix.
I aim to address the relationship between regulation and production in the craft
beer market from 1983-2013. The regulations I investigate are exclusive territories,
franchise laws, and the outlawing of self-distribution. I also include the ratio of the
population of each state that lives in an area where alcohol is completely restricted.
Franchise laws refer to the specific beer franchise laws that many states have, which
include difficult contract termination restrictions between the brewer and distributor. I
expect the sign to be negative in all iterations. Klick and Wright (2008) investigated these
termination restrictions on beer sales and found negative and significant results.
Mandated exclusive territories include all states that require by law exclusive territory
agreements between the brewer and wholesaler. The literature is divided on subject of
the competitive effects of exclusive territories, but Rojas (2012) Klick and Wright (2008)
find that mandated exclusive territories increase beer sales. I expect this variable to
increase production and have a positive and significant impact. Two-tier refers to states
that allow self-distribution. With the intention of easier interpretation of the interaction
dummies, I use Three-tier to refer to states that outlaw self-distribution. The literature is
unanimous on the anti-competitiveness aspect of three-tiered distribution. I expect this
impact to be negative.
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Data:
The primary data set analyzed in this paper was provided by Burgdorf (2016).
His data was obtained via a request to the Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau
(TTB). The TIB keep a record of active brewery permits in every state from the years
1983-2013. These permits do not distinguish the size or type of brewery, however.
Nevertheless, according to the Brewers Association, in 2013, 98% of the 2,917 breweries
were considered a craft brewery, so trends in this variable should be largely accurate.
The data set includes dummy variables for franchise laws, two-tiered distribution, and
mandated exclusive territories, all consistent over the time period17. These variables were
collected by Dr. Burgdorf himself from state statutes. To the full data set I added dummy
variables that separated the country into four regions; Northeast, Midwest, South, and
West. I used what is commonly referred to as the Mason Dixon line to divide the states
into their regions. States south of the line are coded as South, States above Pennsylvania
and New Jersey are coded as Northeast. States western of NM, CO, WY, Montana are
coded as West, and the rest of the states are coded as Midwest. Alaska and Hawaii are
also considered West. I also added variables for dry counties. Many states still have dry
or semi-dry towns and municipalities which would obviously affect the demand for
breweries in those areas. I define the term semi-dry to capture the population who have
limited access on certain kinds of alcohol, or the selling of alcohol in either retail stores
or bars. A dry county is defined as a county, which prohibits the sale of alcohol entirely.
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Semi-dry areas are more common, but the ways that alcohol is restricted varies between
counties and states. For example, some areas restrict just liquor, some restrict liquor to
only be sold by the glass, and others outlaw bars entirely and a “restricted” county
includes both dry and semi-dry counties18. I used the 2014 report from the National
Alcoholic Beverage Control Association (NABCA) as my guide. For every state they
filled out a chart answering questions like:

“How does your state define a "wet county" in the context of alcohol availability
and what is any relevant state law on alcohol availability? Please identify by name
the counties in your state that are defined as wet. Since what date (or for how long
a period of time) has each of the counties you identified been defined as wet? How
does your state define a "dry county" in the context of alcohol availability and what
is any relevant state law on alcohol availability? Please identify by name the
counties or municipalities in your state that are defined as dry. Since what date (or
for how long a period of time) has each of the counties you identified been defined
as dry? Does the state or locality determine whether or not a county is "wet" or
"dry" in the context of alcohol availability?”
I gathered population data from the U.S. Census Bureau for every township or city that
was identified as alcohol restrictive in the year 2013. The total population of people that
live in an area where alcohol is restricted is 7.16 million or 2.26%. It comes as no
surprise that 94.14% of these people live in either the Midwest or the South. The
Midwest accounts for 13.93% and the South for 80.21%. The Northeast and West split
the remaining 5.86% fairly evenly, the North with 3.38% and West with 2.47%.
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Results:
I first estimate a Tobit model with regulation dummies. Table (2) gives the
estimation results. Columns (1) (2) and (3) provide the baseline economic factors and
each of my three regulation dummy variables separately. All coefficients for the baseline
economic factors have the expected sign except unemployment19. State GDP per capita
is positive and significant across the board, while excise taxes are negative and
significant in every case. The coefficient estimate for excise taxes (realtax) is -.421 in
column (2). This means that with a one-dollar increase in taxes per barrel, we would
expect 4,420 fewer barrels produced in that state and year, on average. Column (1) gives
the baseline regulations with the mandated exclusive territories variable. The coefficient
is 9.032 and significant at the 1% level. All else equal, a state with mandated exclusive
territories is expected to have 90,320 more barrels produced that year by small brewers,
on average. The variable franchise laws was negative in most regressions but not
statistically significant in any. I had expected this variable to have a significant negative
impact so this was somewhat surprising. The coefficient on three-tier is always negative
as expected, and significant at the 1% level in columns (3) & (4). When all three
regulations are included in column (4) the results don’t change in magnitude of
coefficients in any appreciable way.
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Columns 5-8 of Table 2 include interactions of the regulatory variables. The coefficients
for exclusive territories are uniformly positive in all specifications. Interestingly, the
combination of exclusive territories with franchise termination restrictions is negative in
all cases, and statistically significant in columns 5 and 8. Similarly, the estimated
combination of exclusive territories and three-tiered distribution is negative and
statistically significant at the 1% level in every case. This was especially interesting
because I was expecting it to go the other way. Klick and Wright (2008) examine a
similar regression where the dependent variable is beer sales, but they get the opposite
results. The estimates interaction of all three regulatory variables is positive and
significant, however.
Table (3) gives the estimation results of equation 2. Regional dummies have the
signs and magnitudes I expected. There does not seem to be any notable differences in
the economic and regulatory factors between these tables indicating that regulations and
regions are not perfectly collinear. Regional effects exist but even controlling for these
effects, the regulatory effects remain the same in terms of magnitude and statistical
significance. As we can see from Figure 12, some laws and combinations of laws are
more common in the South/Midwest as well as the West/Northeast. However, because
there is enough variation state by state with in regions, I can confidently say that the
regulations are influencing regional differences in production, and not simply picking up
on other regional differences that influence craft beer production.
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&KDSWHU&RQFOXVLRQ
With an influx of German immigrants after the Civil War, came an increased
focus on brewing. Locally owned breweries were popping up all over the Northeast and
upper Midwest. This story begins here, with the local and regional brewers of the 1870s.
The national brewers and regional brewers were competitive up until prohibition, but
industry concentration was beginning to take root. Prohibition and the regulations
thereafter, created an environment that favored the shipping brewers. Canning, at home
refrigeration, pasteurization, and advertisements helped grow the market shares of the
leading national brewers. With improvements in technology, much of the brewing
process became automated and the use of multiple plants reduced costs as well. These
firms could reach scale efficiency and the capital investment required to keep up with
them grew larger.
With the increasing concentration, beers became lighter bodied in flavor and more
adjuncts were used in their brewing formulas. The market became full of a homogenous
product. This left an opening that imports and craft beer were able to fill. Local
microbreweries and brewpubs grew in popularity, offering unique flavors of draught beer
in small batches. In the past thirty years, craft beer has been growing, deconstructing and
changing the dynamics of industry concentration.
The spread of craft beer and its prominence began initially has mostly been in the
Northeast and West regions. In this thesis, I investigate the role of one factor, state
regulation, to assess if it had potentially been slowing growth in this market. Regulation
in the beer industry is a hotly debated topic among economists. I find that three-tiered
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distribution and the interaction of exclusive territories and three-tiered distribution have
strong negative effects on beer production of small brewers, significant at the 1% level.
Somewhat surprisingly, I do not find evidence that franchise laws negatively influence
production. Although regional differences remain, overall I find that state regulations in
the beer industry are a meaningful deterrant to growth in craft brewing across states.
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ϲ͘Ϯϵ
ϱ͘Ϯϳ
ϭϲ͘Ϭϵ
ϰϬ͘ϭϲ
ϱ͘Ϯϰ
ϲ͘ϳϲ
ϲϵ͘ϴϱ
Ϯϲ͘ϱϬ
ϱ͘Ϭϲ
tĞƐƚ
Ϭ͘ϱϰ
Ϭ͘Ϯϱ
Ϭ͘ϲϮ
ϭϱ͘ϴϳ
ϰ͘ϳϬ
ϮϬ͘Ϭϰ
ϰϯ͘ϯϭ
ϲ͘Ϭϵ
Ϯ͘ϳϳ
ϲϴ͘ϰϮ
ϰϰ͘ϳϲ
ϭϭ͘ϴϱ
EŽƌƚŚĞĂƐƚ
Ϭ͘ϲϵ
Ϭ͘ϰϯ
Ϭ͘ϳϬ
ϭϰ͘ϲϲ
ϱ͘ϯϯ
ϭϲ͘ϱϰ
ϱϯ͘ϳϯ
ϱ͘ϳϬ
ϭϭ͘ϵϬ
ϳϮ͘ϰϬ
Ϯϰ͘ϱϵ
ϴ͘ϳϮ

ϱϮ

ϱϯ

dĂďůĞϭ
sĂƌŝĂďůĞĞƐĐƌŝƉƚŝŽŶ
sĂƌŝĂďůĞEĂŵĞ
WƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ
ƌĞǁĞƌŝĞƐ
ƌĞǁĞƌŝĞƐͬĐĂƉ

ĞƐĐƌŝƉƚŝŽŶ

^ŽƵƌĐĞ

ĞĞƌͬĐĂƉ

^ƚĂƚĞƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶŝŶϭϬ͕ϬϬϬϯϭͲŐĂůůŽŶďĂƌƌĞůƐ
EƵŵďĞƌŽĨĂĐƚŝǀĞďƌĞǁĞƌǇƌĞĐŽƌĚƐĂƐƌĞƉŽƌƚĞĚďǇƚŚĞddď
EƵŵďĞƌŽĨĂĐƚŝǀĞďƌĞǁĞƌǇƌĞĐŽƌĚƐĂƐƌĞƉŽƌƚĞĚďǇƚŚĞddď
ƉĞƌŵŝůůŝŽŶƉĞŽƉůĞ
ƋƵĂůƐϭŝĨƐƚĂƚĞƐŝŶŚĂƐĂůůŽǁĞĚďƌĞǁĞƌŝĞƐƚŽĚŝƐƚƌŝďƵƚĞ
ƚŚĞŝƌŽǁŶƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŽǀĞƌĞŶƚŝƌĞƐĂŵƉůĞƉĞƌŝŽĚ͕ϬŽƚŚĞƌǁŝƐĞ
ƋƵĂůƐϬŝĨƐƚĂƚĞƐŝŶŚĂƐĂůůŽǁĞĚďƌĞǁĞƌŝĞƐƚŽĚŝƐƚƌŝďƵƚĞ
ƚŚĞŝƌŽǁŶƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŽǀĞƌĞŶƚŝƌĞƐĂŵƉůĞƉĞƌŝŽĚ͕ϭŽƚŚĞƌǁŝƐĞ
ƋƵĂůƐϭŝĨƐƚĂƚĞƐŝŶƚŝŵĞƚŵĂŶĚĂƚĞƐŚĂƐƉĂƐƐĞĚĨƌĂŶĐŚŝƐĞ
ƚĞƌŵŝŶĂƚŝŽŶƌĞƐƚƌŝĐƚŝŽŶůĂǁƐďĞƚǁĞĞŶďƌĞǁĞƌƐĂŶĚ
ǁŚŽůĞƐĂůĞƌƐ͕ϬŽƚŚĞƌǁŝƐĞ
ƋƵĂůƐϭŝĨƐƚĂƚĞƐŝŶƚŝŵĞƚŵĂŶĚĂƚĞƐƚŚĂƚĐŽŶƚƌĂĐƚƐ
ďĞƚǁĞĞŶďƌĞǁĞƌƐĂŶĚǁŚŽůĞƐĂůĞƌƐĚĞƚĂŝůĞǆĐůƵƐŝǀĞ
ǁŚŽůĞƐĂůĞƐĂůĞƐĂƌĞĂƐ͕ϬŽƚŚĞƌǁŝƐĞ
/ŶƚĞƌĂĐƚŝŽŶďĞƚǁĞĞŶǆdĞƌƌĂŶĚ&ƌĂŶ
/ŶƚĞƌĂĐƚŝŽŶďĞƚǁĞĞŶdŚƌĞĞdŝĞƌĂŶĚǆdĞƌƌ
/ŶƚĞƌĂĐƚŝŽŶďĞƚǁĞĞŶdŚƌĞĞdŝĞƌĂŶĚ&ƌĂŶ
EƵŵďĞƌŽĨĂĐƚŝǀĞďƌĞǁĞƌǇƌĞĐŽƌĚƐŝŶƐƵƌƌŽƵŶĚŝŶŐƐƚĂƚĞƐ
ĂƐƌĞƉŽƌƚĞĚďǇƚŚĞddƉĞƌŵŝůůŝŽŶƉĞŽƉůĞ
ZĞĂů'WƉĞƌĐĂƉŝƚĂŝŶϮϬϬϵΨƐ
hŶĞŵƉůŽǇŵĞŶƚƌĂƚĞŝŶƐƚĂƚĞƐĂƚƚŝŵĞƚ
WĞƌĐĞŶƚĂŐĞŽĨƚŚĞƉŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶďůĂĐŬ
WĞƌĐĞŶƚĂŐĞŽĨƉŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶϮϬǇĞĂƌƐĂŶĚŽůĚĞƌ
ZĞĂůĞǆĐŝƐĞƚĂǆƌĂƚĞŽŶďĞĞƌŝŶϮϬϬϵĚŽůůĂƌƐ;ϭϬϬϬͿƉĞƌ
ďĂƌƌĞů
'ĂůůŽŶƐŽĨďĞĞƌĐŽŶƐƵŵĞĚƉĞƌĐĂƉƚŝĂ

tŝŶĞͬĐĂƉ

'ĂůůŽŶƐŽĨǁŝŶĞĐŽŶƐƵŵĞĚƉĞƌĐĂƉŝƚĂ

^ƉŝƌŝƚƐͬĐĂƉ

'ĂůůŽŶƐŽĨƐƉŝƌŝƚƐĐŽŶƐƵŵĞĚƉĞƌĐĂƉŝƚĂ

^ŽƵƚŚ
DŝĚǁĞƐƚ
tĞƐƚ
EŽƌƚŚĞĂƐƚ
ƌǇZĂƚŝŽ

ƋƵĂůƐϭŝĨƐƚĂƚĞŝƐŝŶƚŚĞ^ŽƵƚŚ͕ϬŽƚŚĞƌǁŝƐĞ
ƋƵĂůƐϭŝĨƐƚĂƚĞŝƐŝŶƚŚĞDŝĚǁĞƐƚ͕ϬŽƚŚĞƌǁŝƐĞ
ƋƵĂůƐϭŝĨƐƚĂƚĞŝƐŝŶƚŚĞtĞƐƚ͕ϬŽƚŚĞƌǁŝƐĞ
ƋƵĂůƐϭŝĨƐƚĂƚĞŝƐŝŶƚŚĞEŽƌƚŚĞĂƐƚ͕ϬŽƚŚĞƌǁŝƐĞ
WƌŽƉŽƌƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞƉŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶŝŶƐƚĂƚĞƐƚŚĂƚůŝǀĞƐŝŶĚƌǇ
ůŽĐĂůŝƚǇ
/ŶƚĞƌĂĐƚŝŽŶďĞƚǁĞĞŶdŚƌĞĞdŝĞƌǆdĞƌƌĂŶĚ&ƌĂŶ

dǁŽdŝĞƌ
dŚƌĞĞdŝĞƌ
&ƌĂŶ

ǆdĞƌƌ

ǆ&ƌĂŶ
dŚƌĞĞǆ
dŚƌĞĞ&ƌĂŶ
^ƵƌƌŽƵŶĚŝŶŐ
ƌĞǁĞƌŝĞƐͬĐĂƉ
ZĞĂů'WͬĐĂƉ
hŶĞŵƉůŽǇŵĞŶƚ
йůĂĐŬWŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶ
йϮϬǇĞĂƌнWŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶ
ZĞĂůdĂǆͬďďů

dŚƌĞĞǆ&ƌĂŶ

ϱϰ

ǆƉĞĐƚĞĚ
ƐŝŐŶ

dd
dd
ƵƌŐĚŽƌĨ
ƵƌŐĚŽƌĨ

Ͳ

ƵƌŐĚŽƌĨ

Ͳ

ƵƌŐĚŽƌĨ

н

Ͳ
н


>^
ĞŶƐƵƐ
ĞŶƐƵƐ
ĞĞƌ
/ŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞ
ĞĞƌ
/ŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞ
ĞĞƌ
/ŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞ
ĞĞƌ
/ŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞ

н
Ͳ
Ͳ
н
Ͳ
н
Ͳͬн
Ͳͬн
Ͳ
Ͳ
н

E

Ͳ

dĂďůĞϮ;ƐƚĂŶĚĂƌĚĞƌƌŽƌƐŝŶƉĂƌĞŶƚŚĞƐŝƐͿ
dŽďŝƚǁŝƚŚZĞŐƵůĂƚŽƌǇ/ŶƚĞƌĂĐƚŝŽŶƚĞƌŵƐ
sĂƌŝĂďůĞ
ƉŽƉ

ƵŶĞŵƉ
ƉĐƚďůĂĐŬ

ƉĐƚϮϬƉůƵ
Ɛ

ƌŐĚƉĐĂƉ

ƌĞĂůƚĂǆ
ǁŝŶĞĐĂƉ
ƐƉŝƌŝƚĐĂƉ
ĚƌǇƌĂƚŝŽ

ĞǆƚĞƌƌ

;ϭͿ
Ϯ͘Ϭϴϳ

;ϮͿ
Ϯ͘Ϭϳ

;ϯͿ
Ϯ͘Ϭϭϲ

;Ϭ͘ϭϯͿΎΎΎ

;Ϭ͘ϭϯͿΎΎΎ

;Ϭ͘ϭϯͿΎΎΎ

Ϯ͘Ϭϴϳ
;Ϭ͘ϰͿΎΎΎ
ͲϬ͘ϴϯϰ

ϭ͘ϴϱϯ
;Ϭ͘ϰϭͿΎΎΎ
ͲϬ͘ϳϮϴ

ϭ͘ϳϱϯ
;Ϭ͘ϰͿΎΎΎ
ͲϬ͘ϱϯϮ

;Ϭ͘ϬϵͿΎΎΎ

;Ϭ͘ϬϵͿΎΎΎ

;Ϭ͘ϬϵͿΎΎΎ

ϭ͘ϲϮϵ

;Ϯ͘Ϭϭϰ

ϭ͘ϵϭϮ

;Ϭ͘ϮϭͿΎΎΎ

;Ϭ͘ϮͿΎΎΎ

;Ϭ͘ϮͿΎΎΎ

Ϭ͘ϰϬϯ

Ϭ͘Ϯϵ

Ϭ͘Ϯϲϱ

;Ϭ͘ϬϳͿΎΎΎ

;Ϭ͘ϬϳͿΎΎΎ

;Ϭ͘ϬϳͿΎΎΎ

ͲϬ͘ϯϴϭ
;Ϭ͘ϭͿΎΎΎ
Ϯ͘ϵϰϯ
;ϭ͘ϭϵͿΎΎ
Ͳϴ͘ϲϯϱ
;ϭ͘ϵϲͿΎΎΎ
ͲϰϮ͘ϭϳ
;ϭϱ͘ϲϵͿΎΎ
Ύ
ϵ͘ϬϯϮ

ͲϬ͘ϰϮϭ
;Ϭ͘ϭͿΎΎΎ
Ϭ͘ϵϮϲ
;ϭ͘ϭϱͿ
Ͳϲ͘ϯϯϲ
;ϭ͘ϵϱͿΎΎΎ
ͲϰϮ͘Ϯϯϰ
;ϭϱ͘ϴϱͿΎΎ
Ύ

ͲϬ͘ϰϯϲ
;Ϭ͘ϭͿΎΎΎ
ϭ͘ϭϬϴ
;ϭ͘ϭϵͿ
Ͳϯ͘Ϯϳϵ
;ϭ͘ϵϵͿΎ
Ͳϯϱ͘ϯϬϵ

;Ϭ͘ϮϭͿΎΎ
Ύ
Ϭ͘ϯϰϳ
;Ϭ͘ϬϳͿΎΎ
Ύ
ͲϬ͘ϰϯϱ
;Ϭ͘ϭͿΎΎΎ
Ϭ͘ϴϱϵ
;ϭ͘ϮϯͿ
Ͳϱ͘ϯϲϲ
;ϮͿΎΎΎ
Ͳϯϴ͘ϳϲϭ

;ϭϱ͘ϰϵͿΎΎ

;ϭϱ͘ϲͿΎΎ

Ͳϵ͘ϵϴϳ
;ϭ͘ϳϴͿΎΎΎ

ϭϬ͘ϲϵϱ
;ϭ͘ϴϲͿΎΎ
Ύ
ͲϮ͘Ϭϴ
;Ϯ͘ϭϮͿ
ͲϭϬ͘ϯϭϰ
;ϭ͘ϵͿΎΎΎ

;ϭ͘ϳϲͿΎΎΎ
ĨƌĂŶ

Ͳϭ͘ϴϯϳ
;ϭ͘ϴϵͿ

ƚŚƌĞĞƚŝĞƌ

;ϰͿ
Ϯ͘Ϭϭ
;Ϭ͘ϭϯͿΎΎ
Ύ
ϭ͘ϵϰ
;Ϭ͘ϰͿΎΎΎ
ͲϬ͘ϲϭ
;Ϭ͘ϬϵͿΎΎ
Ύ
ϭ͘ϱϱϲ

ĞǆĨƌĂŶ

;ϱͿ
Ϯ͘Ϭϯ

;ϲͿ
Ϯ͘ϭϯϴ

;ϳͿ
Ϯ͘ϭϭ

;ϴͿ
Ϯ͘ϭϯϱ

;Ϭ͘ϭϯͿΎΎΎ

;Ϭ͘ϭϯͿΎΎΎ

;Ϭ͘ϭϯͿΎΎΎ

;Ϭ͘ϭϯͿΎΎΎ

ϭ͘ϵϮ
;Ϭ͘ϰͿΎΎΎ
ͲϬ͘ϱϵϰ

ϭ͘ϳϳ
;Ϭ͘ϯϵͿΎΎΎ
ͲϬ͘ϲϭϮ

ϭ͘ϴϭϰ
;Ϭ͘ϯϵͿΎΎΎ
ͲϬ͘ϱϴϳ

ϭ͘ϴϭϳ
;Ϭ͘ϯϵͿΎΎΎ
ͲϬ͘ϲϭϯ

;Ϭ͘ϬϵͿΎΎΎ

;Ϭ͘ϬϵͿΎΎΎ

;Ϭ͘ϬϵͿΎΎΎ

;Ϭ͘ϬϵͿΎΎΎ

ϭ͘ϱϵϴ

ϭ͘ϴϰ

ϭ͘ϳϳϳ

ϭ͘ϴϭϲ

;Ϭ͘ϮϭͿΎΎΎ

;Ϭ͘ϮϭͿΎΎΎ

;Ϭ͘ϮϭͿΎΎΎ

;Ϭ͘ϮϭͿΎΎΎ

Ϭ͘ϯϲ

Ϭ͘ϯϮϵ

Ϭ͘ϯϲϯ

Ϭ͘ϯϯϲ

;Ϭ͘ϬϳͿΎΎΎ

;Ϭ͘ϬϳͿΎΎΎ

;Ϭ͘ϬϳͿΎΎΎ

;Ϭ͘ϬϳͿΎΎΎ

ͲϬ͘ϯϴϯ
;Ϭ͘ϭͿΎΎ
Ϭ͘ϲϬϮ
;ϭ͘ϮϯͿ
Ͳϱ͘ϭϮϱ
;Ϯ͘ϬϭͿΎΎ
Ͳϰϭ͘ϯϵϳ
;ϭϱ͘ϲϲͿΎΎ
Ύ
ϮϬ͘Ϯϲ

ͲϬ͘ϮϲϮ
;Ϭ͘ϭͿΎΎ
Ϭ͘ϮϮ
;ϭ͘ϮϮͿ
Ͳϰ͘ϱϰϲ
;ϭ͘ϵϵͿΎΎ
ͲϯϮ͘Ϯϯϳ

ͲϬ͘Ϯϲϯ
;Ϭ͘ϭͿΎΎ
Ϭ͘Ϭϱϭ
;ϭ͘ϮϮͿ
Ͳϰ͘ϲϳ
;ϭ͘ϵϵͿΎΎ
ͲϮϵ͘ϭϮϭ

ͲϬ͘Ϯϲϭ
;Ϭ͘ϭͿΎΎ
Ϭ͘Ϭϱϰ
;ϭ͘ϮϮͿ
Ͳϰ͘ϳϬϵ
;ϭ͘ϵϴͿΎΎ
ͲϮϲ͘ϱϯϮ

;ϭϱ͘ϰϵͿΎΎ

;ϭϱ͘ϱϵͿΎ

;ϭϱ͘ϱϭͿΎ

Ϯϱ͘ϰϰϯ

Ϯϴ͘ϳϬϰ

ϯϲ͘ϲϲϲ

;ϰ͘ϯϵͿΎΎΎ

;ϰ͘ϯϰͿΎΎΎ

;ϰ͘ϲϳͿΎΎΎ

;ϱ͘ϳͿΎΎΎ

Ϭ͘ϴϰ
;Ϯ͘ϲϴͿ
Ͳϭϭ͘ϰϲϮ
;ϰ͘ϬϱͿΎΎΎ
Ͳϭϭ͘ϱϲϴ
;ϰ͘ϳϱͿΎΎ

ͲϮ͘ϳϱϰ
;Ϯ͘ϱϲͿ
Ͳϭ͘ϳϳϯ
;Ϯ͘ϳϯͿ
Ͳϳ͘Ϭϲϲ
;ϰ͘ϲϲͿ
Ͳϭϱ͘ϵϮϱ
;ϯ͘ϰϭͿΎΎΎ

Ͳϱ͘ϱϳϵ
;Ϯ͘ϵϱͿΎ
Ͳϳ͘ϱϳϵ
;ϰ͘ϬϲͿΎ
Ͳϴ͘ϲϱϱ
;ϰ͘ϳϱͿΎ
Ͳϭϴ͘ϱϯϱ
;ϯ͘ϲϳͿΎΎΎ

Ͳϯ͘ϬϴϮ
;ϯ͘ϭϭͿ
ͲϮ͘ϱϭϯ
;ϰ͘ϱϭͿ
Ͳϭϵ͘ϯϵϰ
;ϲ͘ϰϵͿΎΎΎ
Ͳϯϳ͘ϵϱϳ
;ϴ͘ϴϮͿΎΎΎ

Ϭ͘ϲϯϰ

ϴ͘ϳϭϱ

ϭ͘Ϭϴϵ

;ϰ͘ϮϱͿ

;ϰ͘ϰϵͿΎ

;ϱ͘ϰϰͿ
Ϯϯ͘Ϯϵϱ
;ϵ͘ϲϭͿΎΎ
ͲϭϰϬ͘Ϯϯ
;ϭϱ͘ϳϱͿΎΎ
Ύ

ƚŚƌĞĞĞǆ
ƚŚƌĞĞĨƌĂ
Ŷ
ƚŚƌĞĞĞǆĨƌĂŶ
ĐŽŶƐƚĂŶƚ

ͲϭϯϬ͘ϲϵϱ
;ϭϱ͘ϭϭͿΎΎ
Ύ

Ͳϭϰϰ͘ϳϳϳ
;ϭϱ͘ϬϯͿΎΎ
Ύ

Ͳϭϯϯ͘ϯϴ
;ϭϰ͘ϵϱͿΎΎ
Ύ

Ͳϭϭϳ͘ϭϵϴ
;ϭϱͿΎΎΎ

ϱϱ

ͲϭϮϮ͘ϳϰ
;ϭϱ͘ϱϴͿΎΎ
Ύ

ͲϭϰϮ͘Ϭϴ
;ϭϱ͘ϲϮͿΎΎ
Ύ

Ͳϭϯϳ͘ϵϮϲ
;ϭϱ͘ϳϳͿΎΎ
Ύ

dĂďůĞϯ;ƐƚĂŶĚĂƌĚĞƌƌŽƌƐŝŶƉĂƌĞŶƚŚĞƐŝƐͿ
dŽďŝƚǁŝƚŚZĞŐƵůĂƚŽƌǇ/ŶƚĞƌĂĐƚŝŽŶƚĞƌŵƐĂŶĚZĞŐŝŽŶĂůƵŵŵŝĞƐ
sĂƌŝĂďůĞ
ƐŽƵƚŚ

ŵŝĚǁĞƐƚ

ǁĞƐƚ

ƉŽƉ

ƵŶĞŵƉ

ƉĐƚďůĂĐŬ

ƉĐƚϮϬƉůƵ
Ɛ

ƌŐĚƉĐĂƉ

ƌĞĂůƚĂǆ

ǁŝŶĞĐĂƉ

ƐƉŝƌŝƚĐĂƉ

;ϭͿ

;ϮͿ

;ϯͿ

;ϰͿ

;ϱͿ

;ϲͿ

;ϳͿ

;ϴͿ

ͲϭϮ͘ϰϭϲ

ͲϭϬ͘Ϭϴ

Ͳϱ͘ϮϬϲ

Ͳϳ͘Ϯϴϲ

Ͳϳ͘ϲϴϲ

Ͳϳ͘Ϭϴϴ

Ͳϴ͘ϮϬϲ

Ͳϳ͘ϲϲϴ

;ϯͿΎΎΎ

;ϯ͘ϬϯͿΎΎΎ

;ϯ͘ϭϰͿΎ

;ϯ͘ϭϭͿΎΎ

;ϯ͘ϮϭͿΎΎ

;ϯ͘ϭͿΎΎ

;ϯ͘ϭϴͿΎΎΎ

;ϯ͘ϮϰͿΎΎ

ͲϭϬ͘ϴϱϲ

Ͳϵ͘ϴϮ

Ͳϳ͘ϭϯϱ

Ͳϴ͘ϬϱϮ

Ͳϳ͘ϵϬϰ

Ͳϵ͘ϬϬϭ

ͲϭϬ͘Ϯϳϰ

Ͳϵ͘ϴϴϲ

;Ϯ͘ϳϰͿΎΎΎ

;Ϯ͘ϳϵͿΎΎΎ

;Ϯ͘ϴϭͿΎΎ

;Ϯ͘ϳϱͿΎΎΎ

;Ϯ͘ϴϮͿΎΎ
Ύ

;Ϯ͘ϳϱͿΎΎΎ

;Ϯ͘ϴϴͿΎΎΎ

;Ϯ͘ϵϭͿΎΎΎ

ϭϮ͘ϱϰϰ

ϭϬ͘ϳ

ϭϮ͘ϭϰϭ

ϭϰ͘Ϯϭ

ϭϯ͘ϵϯϭ

ϭϮ͘ϭϭϲ

ϭϬ͘ϵϬϵ

ϭϬ͘ϴϳϭ

;Ϯ͘ϯϳͿΎΎΎ

;Ϯ͘ϰͿΎΎΎ

;Ϯ͘ϯϵͿΎΎΎ

;Ϯ͘ϯϳͿΎΎΎ

;Ϯ͘ϰϯͿΎΎ
Ύ

;Ϯ͘ϰϮͿΎΎΎ

;Ϯ͘ϱϱͿΎΎΎ

;Ϯ͘ϱϱͿΎΎΎ

Ϯ͘Ϯϳϯ

Ϯ͘Ϯϯϵ

Ϯ͘ϭϱϭ

Ϯ͘ϭϴ

Ϯ͘ϭϵϯ

Ϯ͘Ϯϲϯ

Ϯ͘Ϯϰϱ

Ϯ͘Ϯϱϭ

;Ϭ͘ϭϯͿΎΎΎ

;Ϭ͘ϭϯͿΎΎΎ

;Ϭ͘ϭϯͿΎΎΎ

;Ϭ͘ϭϯͿΎΎΎ

;Ϭ͘ϭϯͿΎΎ
Ύ

;Ϭ͘ϭϯͿΎΎΎ

;Ϭ͘ϭϯͿΎΎΎ

;Ϭ͘ϭϯͿΎΎΎ

ϭ͘ϰϵϰ

ϭ͘ϯϮϰ

ϭ͘ϮϬϲ

ϭ͘ϯϴ

ϭ͘ϯϳϮ

ϭ͘ϯϭϵ

ϭ͘ϯϳϮ

ϭ͘ϯϳϵ

;Ϭ͘ϰͿΎΎΎ

;Ϭ͘ϰϭͿΎΎΎ

;Ϭ͘ϰͿΎΎΎ

;Ϭ͘ϯϵͿΎΎΎ

;Ϭ͘ϰͿΎΎΎ

;Ϭ͘ϯϵͿΎΎΎ

;Ϭ͘ϯϵͿΎΎΎ

;Ϭ͘ϯϵͿΎΎΎ

ͲϬ͘ϯϯϳ

ͲϬ͘ϯϭϰ

ͲϬ͘ϭϵϱ

ͲϬ͘Ϯϭϭ

ͲϬ͘ϭϵϲ

ͲϬ͘Ϯϲϰ

ͲϬ͘Ϯϱϭ

ͲϬ͘ϮϳϮ

;Ϭ͘ϭϭͿΎΎΎ

;Ϭ͘ϭϭͿΎΎΎ

;Ϭ͘ϭϭͿΎ

;Ϭ͘ϭϭͿΎ

;Ϭ͘ϭϭͿΎ

;Ϭ͘ϭϭͿΎΎ

;Ϭ͘ϭϭͿΎΎ

;Ϭ͘ϭϮͿΎΎ

ϭ͘ϵϰϲ

Ϯ͘ϯϯϲ

Ϯ͘ϮϳϮ

ϭ͘ϴϰϲ

ϭ͘ϴϳϴ

Ϯ͘ϬϬϵ

ϭ͘ϵϰϵ

ϭ͘ϵϲ

;Ϭ͘ϮϭͿΎΎΎ

;Ϭ͘ϮϭͿΎΎΎ

;Ϭ͘ϮͿΎΎΎ

;͘ϮϭͿΎΎΎ

;Ϭ͘ϮϮͿΎΎ
Ύ

;Ϭ͘ϮϭͿΎΎΎ

;Ϭ͘ϮϮͿΎΎΎ

;Ϭ͘ϮϮͿΎΎΎ

Ϭ͘Ϯϴϰ

Ϭ͘ϭϵϯ

Ϭ͘ϭϲϵ

Ϭ͘Ϯϲϲ

Ϭ͘Ϯϳ

Ϭ͘Ϯϲϴ

Ϭ͘Ϯϵϴ

Ϭ͘Ϯϵ

;Ϭ͘ϳͿΎΎΎ

;Ϭ͘ϬϴͿΎΎ

;Ϭ͘ϬϳͿΎΎ

;Ϭ͘ϬϳͿΎΎΎ

;Ϭ͘ϬϴͿΎΎ
Ύ

;Ϭ͘ϬϳͿΎΎΎ

;Ϭ͘ϬϴͿΎΎΎ

;Ϭ͘ϬϴͿΎΎΎ

ͲϬ͘ϰϯϴ

ͲϬ͘ϰϲ

ͲϬ͘ϱϮ

ͲϬ͘ϰϵϵ

ͲϬ͘ϰϱϳ

ͲϬ͘ϯϳϴ

ͲϬ͘ϯϳϳ

ͲϬ͘ϯϳϱ

;Ϭ͘ϭͿΎΎΎ

;Ϭ͘ϭͿΎΎΎ

;Ϭ͘ϭͿΎΎΎ

;Ϭ͘ϭͿΎΎΎ

;Ϭ͘ϭͿΎΎΎ

;Ϭ͘ϭϭͿΎΎΎ

;Ϭ͘ϭϭͿΎΎΎ

;Ϭ͘ϭϭͿΎΎΎ

Ͳϭ͘ϵϭϱ

Ͳϯ͘ϳϲ

Ͳϰ͘ϵϬϴ

Ͳϯ͘ϬϰϮ

Ͳϯ͘ϭϰϵ

Ͳϯ͘ϱϰϮ

Ͳϯ͘ϵϯϴ

Ͳϯ͘ϴϭ

;Ͳϭ͘ϯϵͿ

;ϭ͘ϯϵͿΎΎΎ

;ϭ͘ϯϵͿΎΎΎ

;ϭ͘ϯϴͿΎΎ

;ϭ͘ϰͿΎΎ

;ϭ͘ϯϴͿΎΎ

;ϭ͘ϰϭͿΎΎΎ

;ϭ͘ϰϭͿΎΎΎ

Ͳϰ͘ϳϳ

ͲϮ͘ϱϯϲ

Ϭ͘ϭϱϰ

Ͳϭ͘ϵϵϲ

Ͳϭ͘ϵϮ

Ͳϭ͘ϰϳϰ

Ͳϭ͘ϱϮϴ

Ͳϭ͘ϱϵ

;ϭ͘ϵϲͿΎΎ

;ϭ͘ϵϳͿ

;Ϯ͘ϬϭͿ

;ϮͿ

;ϮͿ

;ϭ͘ϵϵͿ

;ϭ͘ϵϵͿ

;ϭ͘ϵϵͿ

ϱϲ

dryratio

exterr

-38.332

-38.746

-38.02

-37.19

-38.27

-34.904

-33.156

-32.285

(15.95)**

(16.2)**

(15.87)**

(15.83)**

(15.86)*
*

(15.71)**

(15.76)**

(15.76)**

12.565

13.362

19.749

23.267

26.097

28.903

(1.76)***

(1.85)***

(4.4)***

(4.31)***

(4.7)***

(5.7)***

0.581

-0.461

1.497

-1.287

-3.739

-2.801

(1.88)

(2.11)

(2.66)

(2.54)

(3.01)

(3.19)

-9.339

-10.163

-10.566

-3.775

-8.169

-6.223

(1.84)***

(1.95)***

(4.02)**
*

(2.8)

(4.03)**

(4.59)

-7.74

-4.413

-5.726

-9.577

(4.74)

(4.66)

(4.75)

(6.48)

-11.698

-14.127

-21.302

(3.5)***

(3.85)***

(9.07)**

0.118

7.173

4.222

(4.35)

(4.72)

(5.79)

fran

threetier

exfran

threeex

threefra
n

threeexfran

8.526
(9.76)

constant

-144.589

-160.163

-151.837

-134.367

-138.313

-148.528

-143.395

-144.398

(15.44)**
*

(15.58)**
*

(15.47)**
*

(15.31)**
*

(16.1)**
*

(15.73)**
*

(16.08)**
*

(16.10)**
*
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